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Abstract
The electricity is a vital asset and a priority for the social
and economic development of today’s world. Building en-
ergy infrastructures with high efficiency and renewable en-
ergy sources is an important yet challenging task for a sus-
tainable future. Smart grid is a term referring to a modern-
ized electrical grid that uses information and communica-
tions technology to gather and act on information, such as
information about the behaviors of suppliers and consumers,
in an automated fashion to improve the efficiency, reliability,
economics, and sustainability of the production and distribu-
tion of electricity.
The main issue of this thesis is to propose new solutions which
help end-users to optimize their consumption and better man-
age their own electricity costs. More specifically, the chal-
lenge is to make elastic the demand for, and the supply of,
electricity of prosumers in order to optimize their energy cost
based on power market conditions and on suitable constraints
on their power consumption. By definition, a prosumer is a
user that not only consumes, but also produces and stores
electricity.
In our work, we focus on power market models in which
prosumers interact in a distributed environment during the
purchase or sale of electric power. We have chosen to follow
the distributed power market model DEZENT. Our contribu-
tion is the planning phase of the consumption of prosumers
based on the negotiation mechanism of DEZENT. We pro-
pose a controller for the planning of the consumption which
aims at minimizing the electricity cost achieved at the end of
xviii
a day. Our controller model exploits the standard dynamic
programming algorithm and in the thesis we discuss the as-
sumptions on which the controller design is based.
In order to evaluate the performance of our introduced con-
troller, we performed extended experimental studies based
on the available DEZENT simulator and on the Java imple-
mentation of the optimal controller. Our main result is that
the highest energy cost reduction was obtained when we have
a high variance on the profile cost of the electricity, the pro-
sumer environment is in the undersupply situation and the
reserve capacity of the controller is infinite. Vice versa, the
lowest energy cost reduction corresponds to low variance,
oversupply situation and finite reserve capacity. Furthermore
the study of the problem of (sub) optimal repeated re-planning
for the rest of the day has shown that a prosumer having
to consume more than expected will pay a remarkable addi-
tional cost at the end of the day which depends also on the in-
creased unit costs; in the case in which a part of the available
energy reserve is lost, the additional cost paid is proportional
to the amount of energy lost.
In summary the general idea behind the planning (optimiza-
tion) phase of a consumer is to plan consumption as smartly
(delay or anticipate the consumption) as possible during a
day, a week, a month or even a year. The results of this be-
havior is the minimization of the electricity cost in the long
run, under certain assumptions on energy costs, as resulted
by local negotiations, and on the acceptable variations of con-
sumer requests. One of the open issues is the global effect
of our introduced controller in a prosumer population since
each prosumer can make use of it. We believe that the issue
can lead to a congestion problem similar to that of the minor-
ity game problem proposed in economics literature.
xix
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Presentation of the area
As global perspective, Smart Grid means different things in different
countries (China, Brazil, Singapore, India and USA) [1, 2, 3, 4]. Although
there is no standard global definition, the European Technology Platform
Smart Grid defines smart grids as electricity networks that can intelli-
gently integrate the behavior and actions of all users connected to it such
as producers, consumers and prosumer1. The aim is to efficiently deliver
sustainable, economic and secure electricity supplies through the use of
innovative products and services together with intelligent monitoring,
control, communication, and self-healing technologies [5]. The power
grid operation can be subdivided into three main task (see Figure 1):
• Centralized power generation: where electricity is produced by large
size energy source generation as coal plant, nuclear plant, natural
gas plant and hydroelectric plant. Generally, the electricity is pro-
duced in a extra high voltage in the order of 265 to 275 KV.
• Power transmission: it is a high voltage electric transmission in the
order of 110 KV or above, from generating power plants to sub-
1Prosumer: a user that not only consumes electricity, but also produces and stores elec-
tricity.
1
stations located near to population centers. The electricity is trans-
mitted at high voltages to reduce the energy lost in long distance
transmission and power is usually transmitted through overhead
power lines.
• Electricity distribution: it is the final stage in the delivery of elec-
tricity to end users or consumers. It works typically at medium-
voltage (less than 50 KV) and low-voltage (less than 1 KV).
Figure 1: Diagram of an electric power system
Furthermore the power grid sector is subject to limitations which af-
fect the market model organization. We can refer to network externalities
which are due to technological limits: the electricity cannot be infinitely
stored and must therefore be generated as it is needed; and power line
losses are due to long distance transmission (this is a more general prob-
lem and we do not handle it). These limitations generate a problem of
stability in the management of the electricity network and the need to
ensure a balance between the electricity production and consumption
[6]. In fact, in the worst case scenario the difference between the electric-
ity supply and the electricity demand can be very large. This can lead to
blackout situations (under production) or storage issues (over produc-
tion). Furthermore the mechanism used to guarantee the close match be-
tween load and generation is coordinated through the electricity market.
In a regulated market, broker companies offer fixed prices to end con-
sumers independently of the demand and supply situation, and most of
2
the time users have no way to understand the pricing mechanisms which
affect the growing cost of the electricity.
The continuously increasing cost of the electricity along with the need
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to protect the environment, have
made energy efficiency one of the technological challenges of our cen-
tury. The purpose is to optimize the grid operation and the electricity
usage worldwide. We can refer to the EU’s 20-20-20 climate change ob-
jectives, whose target for the year 2020 includes: 20% reduction in green-
house gas emissions, 20% EU renewables share and 20% savings in con-
sumption by improving energy efficiency [7]. These goals require new
solutions and management strategies at the (see Figure 2):
1. power and energy layer;
2. communications layer;
3. computing and information technology layer.
In the power and energy layer there is a need to integrate renewable en-
ergy sources in the electricity production chain, such as solar and wind,
in order to reduce the peak of energy consumption and transmission
losses. This may lead to a decentralization of the power grid due to the
electricity production from the medium and low voltage layers of the
grid; and to the need to take into account the intermittence of renewable
energy sources during the electricity production. In the communication
layer, and in the computing and information technology layer, both elec-
tric power and information flows will be distributed. The need to reduce
energy demand imbalances will require tackling the optimization of the
electricity generation, transportation and distribution. This will be possi-
ble by controlling the real-time collection of data on the status of systems
and on the network, and by using advanced technologies of communica-
tion and elaboration of data based on models of distributed computing
and on adaptive algorithms.
Consumer side management will change and new scenarios will oc-
cur. For instance, when power is least expensive the user can turn on
selected home appliances such as washing machines or factory processes
3
Figure 2: Smart grid foundational layers
that can run at arbitrary hours, while at peak time they could turn off se-
lected appliances to reduce demand or shift usage. End-users will now
plays different roles acting as producer or consumer and thus they will
contribute to energy saving in the network. As a result, also the electric-
ity market place may change and become open and competitive (stan-
dard economic viewpoint). Consumers may be capable to express pref-
erence according to tariff price or contract offers by choosing the best
company or broker agent. Market decentralization will lead to both big
and small player participation in the electricity market scenario and con-
sequently competition will increase. The electricity market may have to
change its operation according to the stakeholder (producer, consumer,
and broker). In addition, the entrance of plug-in electric vehicles (PEV)
will increase the load factor of the grid. PEV could buffer renewable
power sources such as wind or solar power, for example, by storing ex-
cess energy produced during windy or sunny periods and returning it
back to the grid during high load periods, thus effectively stabilizing the
intermittency of wind or solar power.
The electricity challenges mentioned above will require heavy invest-
ments, and someone would have to pay for their costs. Will it be the
state or the power companies? Because of capital exposure and risk man-
4
Figure 3: Components to be integrated in the traditional grid system
agement, a shift of interest of investors (state or companies) from large
scale power generation plants to medium and low generation renewable
energy sources is another challenge to be addressed. In European coun-
tries, governmental aims to increase the portion of sustainable energy
in the national energy mix have been translated into incentives and tax
policies to promote the uptake of renewable energy sources. Reduced en-
ergy price would be undoubtedly one of the key results of the challenge
of transforming the energy system to become sustainable. Despite these
efforts and as a result of the deregulation of power grid, the long-term
prospects for large-scale investments in power generation are unclear at
this moment. The investments will be possible only if the impact of the
reconstruction will be to increase the efficiency of power grid manage-
ment.
1.2 General description of work
Decentralized power management systems will play a key role in re-
ducing greenhouse gas emissions and increasing electricity production
through alternative energy sources. In this thesis, we focus on power
market models in which prosumers interact in a distributed environment
during the purchase or sale of electric power. We have chosen to follow
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the distributed power market model DEZENT [49, 50]. Our contribution
[42] is the planning phase of the consumption of prosumers based on
the negotiation mechanism of DEZENT. We propose a controller for the
planning of the consumption which aims at minimizing the electricity
cost achieved at the end of a day. In the thesis we discuss the assump-
tions on which the controller design is based.
Motivation
The continuously increasing cost of the electricity along with the need to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to protect the environment, have made
energy efficiency one of the technological challenges of our century. In
particular, one of the challenges of the smart power grids is to make elas-
tic the demand/offer of electricity of prosumers connected to the grid.
A prosumer (producer-consumer) is defined as a user that not only con-
sumes, but also produces and stores electricity. An improved integration
of renewable energy production in the power grid for a better balancing
of energy will require both negotiation mechanisms which favor local ac-
cess and prosumer planning policies which take into account the cost of
energy at different times (of day, week, year).
Background power markets
In the new era of smart power grid, we can distinguish between two
types of electricity power management systems: the centralized [19, 46]
and the decentralized [49] system. The centralized power management
system is currently used in many countries. The main feature of this
model is that at the physical layer, the grid is designed for a one-way
flow of the electricity. More precisely energy flows from the top (where
the electricity is generated in large power plants and transported to local
substations) to the bottom (final stage in the delivery of electricity to end
users). The wholesale power market (see Robert Wilson [54] ) can be sub-
divided into two categories: integrated (or pool) market and unbundled
(or forward) market.
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DEZENT
The idea behind a decentralized power management system is to exploit
the increasing integration of decentralized energy resources (DER) into
the distribution network. DER systems are exploiting modern technolo-
gies based on solar or wind power, or on other renewable energy sources.
In particular we refer to the real-time and distributed power manage-
ment system DEZENT. DEZENT [49, 50] is the result of an R&D project
involving the School of Computer Science and the College of Electri-
cal Engineering of the Dortmund University, the E.ON Energy company
and DFG, the German Research Foundation. The project was devoted to
decentralized and adaptive electric power management through a dis-
tributed real-time multi-agent architecture. DEZENT philosophy is to
make as local as possible the exchange of electricity between various pro-
sumers. Since the power market is managed in a decentralized manner,
prosumers able to carry out more exchanges at the local level will get
more benefits.
In the DEZENT initiative, a multi-level bottom-up solution has been de-
veloped where autonomous collaborative software agents negotiate avail-
able energy quantities (the DEZENT algorithm [49]). Moreover, since
much of the production (e.g. from wind farms or from solar panels) is
highly unpredictable, the distributed negotiations algorithm of DEZENT
is finalized within short intervals of 0.5 sec. This approach guarantees
that the negotiation process is stable, or constant, enough, for a fair and
transparent bidding and offering of the partners involved. During each
slot of 0.5 sec, the negotiation algorithm proceeds bottom-up, from the
0.4 KV to the 110 KV layers, guaranteeing the balancing of electric power.
In addition, a Demand Side and Supply Management (DSSM) algorithm
[51] is applied in order to reduce the need of negotiating in the free power
market. At the end of the negotiation, each prosumer independently and
simultaneously adjusts his/her bidding strategies. This is carried out by
the DECOLEARN algorithm [52] which exploits reinforcement learning
principles of machine learning.
7
Problem definition
A smart grid is an electricity network that can intelligently integrate the
actions of all prosumers connected to it, in order to efficiently deliver sus-
tainable, economic and secure electricity supplies. The main issue is to
propose new solutions which help end-users to optimize their consump-
tion and better manage their own electricity costs. More specifically, the
challenge is to make elastic the demand for, and the supply of, electricity
of prosumers in order to optimize their energy cost based on power mar-
ket conditions and on suitable constraints on their power consumption.
Contribution
Our contribution is the planning phase of the consumption of prosumers
based on the negotiation mechanism of DEZENT. We believe that in-
dependent planning by the prosumers may improve significantly the
matching between production and consumption in the DEZENT power
grid. In fact, each prosumer should try as much as possible to inde-
pendently modify his/her power requirements optimizing his cost. In
practice, this could mean to help balancing the power market, since the
price will favor low consumption/high production when the cost is high
and vice versa. Moreover, our approach is not centralized. The idea is
to exploit the (limited) ability of prosumers of planning their consump-
tion/production. Hence they do not sign any contract leaving the plan-
ning to others: our independent consumer planning is a local matter in-
volving only one prosumer. The planning phase [6] we propose is based
on optimization techniques and exploits an efficient dynamic program-
ming algorithm.
Furthermore we study the problem of (sub) optimal repeated re-planning
for the rest of the day (of an active consumer) when the consumption
varies wrt. the planned profile. These changes can be due to the need of
additional power - which however does not require any changes of the
planned profile - or to the loss of a part of the available energy reserve.
Finally we study the effect of the capacity of the energy reserve on the
prosumer ability of planning their consumption.
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Methodology
The main issue is that electricity may have a rather different price de-
pending on the time period, be it of the day, of the week or of the year.
More specifically, it depends on several exogenous factors, e.g. on the
actual cost of energy at the global level, but also on the existence of con-
venient energy exchanges at the local level and on the fairness of avail-
able market mechanisms. The case we consider is that of a decentralized
power market like DEZENT, where prices can change rapidly and users
may not have explicit information about electricity cost. Hence the be-
havior (consumption) of the consumer will be based on the information
(s)he has on (i) the estimated cost of the electricity and (ii) the consump-
tion constraints. His goal is to minimize the electricity cost at the end
of a day while consuming the same amount of energy. To simplify our
study, we make some assumptions, which highlight certain aspects of
the problem.
1. The DEZENT negotiation process and the DECOLEARN algorithm
prevent agent selfishness and their convergence does not heavily
depend on the cost of energy or on the amount of power actually
exchanged, which can vary a lot e.g. during the day. Those param-
eters are just scale factors.
2. From the point of view of the prosumer, the unit cost of energy af-
ter the DEZENT negotiation depends mainly on two factors: (a) the
free market power cost; (b) the prosumer environment: heavy pro-
duction, heavy consumption or equilibrated prosumer population
may yield rather different energy costs. The variance of the free
market power cost is particularly relevant: high variance does of-
fer the prosumer a better chance of allocating his/her power needs
when it is more convenient economically.
3. The amount of gain depends on the ability of the prosumer at mod-
ifying his/her demand and supply needs. We consider a day-long
profile and divide it in a number of slots. Moreover, we assume that
a prosumer has the ability of increasing or decreasing, up to some
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amount, the required power. In addition, he/she has a bounded
reserve: thus given the prosumer original consumption profile, the
sum of all the positive/negative changes should never exceed the
available reserve.
4. If the prosumer knew the actual cost of energy in every slot, he/she
could compute (by dynamic programming) a profile of changes
which, among the allowed profiles, would optimize the gain. Of
course he/she cannot foresee the future. A reasonable estimate
of the cost of energy in every slot can be obtained by looking at
the values in the previous day. In fact, if we assume that the free
market cost in the same slot of the previous day is the same, that
the prosumer environment is the same and that the DECOLEARN
algorithm is close to convergence, we can safely rely on the after-
DECOLEARN costs of the previous day. Of course the prosumer
environment has a stochastic behavior, thus if might behave differ-
ently in the two days. To improve the estimate, we could take an
average of several days, or we could install a new reinforcement
learning process. However both approaches apparently do not of-
fer significant improvements experimentally, while in addition the
latter choice is computationally very expensive, since different slots
should be equipped with different parameters.
5. In summary, our approach depends on the following parameters:
(a) the profile of the free market power cost in every slot, and in
particular its variance; (b) the prosumer environment: heavy pro-
duction, heavy consumption or equilibrated prosumer population;
(c) how to estimate the cost of energy after the DEZENT negotia-
tion; (d) the amount of allowed power increase/decrease; and (e)
the available reserve. Items (a) and (b) affect the simulations but
their values are not directly available to the prosumer, while items
(c), (d) and (e) are available inputs for prosumers optimal planning.
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Experimental results
We performed extended experimental studies based on the available DEZENT
simulator and on a Java implementation of the optimal controller. An
experiment depends essentially on three parameters: (1) the free mar-
ket power cost, which can exhibit high, low or average variance: for this
we chose real data from the day ahead market prices of Switzerland,
Italy and Germany respectively; (2) the prosumer environment, namely
heavy production, heavy consumption or equilibrated prosumer popu-
lation; and (3) the available reserve capacity which can be either finite
or infinite. For every combination of the parameters we synthesized the
optimal controller and computed the gain with respect to a neutral con-
sumer operating in the same environment (i.e. within a context of other
prosumers, which are the same in both cases). As it could be expected,
the highest energy cost reduction was obtained when we have a high
variance on the profile cost of the electricity, the prosumer environment is
in the undersupply situation and the reserve capacity of the controller is
infinite. Vice versa, the lowest energy cost reduction corresponds to low
variance, oversupply situation and finite reserve capacity. The most con-
tentious item, i.e. how to estimate the cost of energy after the DEZENT
negotiation, turned out not to be very relevant. In fact, computing the
optimal profile with the power costs of the previous day, or, anticipating
the future, of the present day, did not produce large differences in the
final cost.
An interesting question is what is the effect on the DEZENT nego-
tiation process of the increased power demand in the low cost periods
(and decrease during high cost) caused by our planning approach. We
observed a limited negative feedback effect: more demand caused an
increase in cost, which in turn made less convenient to increase power
demand in that period. We measured this effect by comparing the unit
costs of the neutral and of the active user after the DEZENT negotiation.
However the negative feedback effect is anyway included in our final
cost comparisons between the neutral and the active consumer.
The study of the problem of (sub) optimal repeated re-planning for
the rest of the day has shown that a prosumer having to consume more
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than expected will pay a remarkable additional cost at the end of the day
which depends also on the increased unit costs; in the case in which a
part of the available energy reserve is lost, the additional cost paid is pro-
portional to the amount of energy lost. However, replanning is definitely
convenient with respect to continuing with the old plan, just adapted for
the loss of power.
Summary
The general idea behind the planning (optimization) phase of a con-
sumer is to plan consumption as smartly (delay or anticipate the con-
sumption) as possible during a day, a week, a month or even a year. The
results of this behavior is the minimization of the electricity cost in the
long run, under certain assumptions on energy costs, as resulted by local
negotiations, and on the acceptable variations of consumer requests. Fu-
ture work might consider particular kinds of prosumers and their energy
storing devices, e.g. batteries of electric cars, modeling their peculiar
abilities of adapting their needs to variable energy cost profiles.
1.3 Synopsis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2 theo-
retical backgrounds on reinforcement learning are considered both in the
computer science and economics perspective. Later in chapter 3, smart
power grid scenarios are considered. In chapter 4 we give a more de-
tailed description of the power market model of DEZENT from which
our study is based. A controller is then proposed in chapter 5 for plan-
ning the consumption of a prosumer connected to the grid. The perfor-
mance of our introduced controller is studied through experiments in
chapter 6. Finally in chapter 7 we present conclusions and future works.
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Chapter 2
Background on
Reinforcement Learning
In this chapter, the theoretical background on reinforcement learning is
presented. In particular, we refer to the field of computer science (ma-
chine learning), where the basics of reinforcement learning are studied,
and to the field of economics and game theory (minority games), where
reinforcement learning is seen as a particular game. In a few words,
the idea behind reinforcement learning is that there is an agent inter-
acting with a dynamic environment about which it has no information:
the agent’s goal is to learn the behavior of the environment and then
to modify its actions accordingly. Reinforcement learning can be subdi-
vided into 2 steps: the choice of the action to be executed and the reward
to be assigned to that action. As the agent has no exact information about
the state of the environment (it depends on the behavior of other agents
involved), the choice of an action is made probabilistically, according to
a distribution which depends on past experiences. The reward assigned
to the action taken is based on the result of the interaction with the envi-
ronment. The probabilities of actions are then modified in such a way to
increase the long-run reward.
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2.1 Reinforcement learning
2.1.1 Literature on Reinforcement Learning
Behavioral psychology [8], also called learning perspective, is a philos-
ophy of psychology based on the proposition that all things that organ-
isms do, including acting, thinking, and feeling can and should be re-
garded as behaviors. Inspired by behavioral psychology, reinforcement
learning is an area of machine learning within computer science, con-
cerned with how an agent ought to take actions in an environment so
as to maximize some notion of cumulative reward. The problem, due to
its generality, is studied in many other disciplines, such as game theory,
operations research, information theory, simulation-based optimization,
statistics, and genetic algorithms. The problem has been studied in op-
timal control theory, though most studies there are concerned with the
existence of optimal solutions and their characterization, and not with
the learning or approximation aspects.
In economics and game theory [28], reinforcement learning may be
used to explain how equilibrium may arise under bounded rationality.
Bounded rationality is the idea that in decision-making, rationality of
individuals is limited by the information they have, the cognitive limita-
tions of their minds, and the finite amount of time they have to make a
decision. It was proposed by Herbert Simon as an alternative basis for the
mathematical modeling of decision making, as used in economics and re-
lated disciplines. Bounded rationality complements optimization, which
views decision-making as a fully rational process of finding an optimal
choice given the information available.
In computer science [39], reinforcement learning is the problem faced
by an agent that must learn the behavior through trial-and-error inter-
actions with a dynamic environment. There are two main strategies
for solving reinforcement-learning problems: the first is to search in the
space of behaviors in order to found one that performs well in the envi-
ronment and this approach has been taken by work in genetic algorithms
and genetic programming; the second is to use statistical techniques and
dynamic programming methods to estimate the utility of taking actions
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in states of the world. Hereafter we are focusing on statistical techniques
because they take advantage of the special structure of reinforcement-
learning problems, which is not available in optimization problems in
general [39]. In the standard reinforcement-learning model, an agent
is connected to its environment via perception and action, as depicted
in figure 4. On each step of interaction the agent receives as input, i,
some indication of the current state, s, of the environment; the agent then
chooses an action, a, as output. The action changes the state of the en-
vironment, and the value of this state transition is communicated to the
agent through a scalar reinforcement signal, r. The agent’s behavior, B,
should choose actions that tend to increase the long-run sum of values of
the reinforcement signal. It can learn to do this over time by systematic
trial and error, guided by a wide variety of algorithms.
Figure 4: The standard reinforcement-learning model.
For example, the simplest possible reinforcement-learning problem is
known as the k-armed bandit problem [26], which has been the subject
of a great deal of study in the statistics and applied mathematics litera-
ture (Berry & Fristedt, 1985). The agent is in a room with a collection of k
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gambling machines (each called a ”one-armed bandit” in colloquial En-
glish). The agent is permitted a fixed number of pulls, h. Any arm may
be pulled on each turn. The machines do not require a deposit to play;
the only cost is in wasting a pull playing a suboptimal machine. When
arm i is pulled, machine i pays off 1 or 0, according to some underlying
probability parameter pi , where payoffs are independent events and the
pis are unknown. The major issue is: what should the agent’s strategy
be? The k-armed bandit problem illustrates the fundamental tradeoff be-
tween exploitation and exploration. In fact, the agent might believe that
a particular arm has a fairly high payoff probability; should it choose
that arm all the time, or should it choose another one that it has less in-
formation about, but seems to be worse? Answers to these questions
depend on how long the agent is expected to play the game; the longer
the game lasts, the worse the consequences of prematurely converging
on a sub-optimal arm, and the more the agent should explore.
2.1.2 Learning to Predict by the Methods of Temporal Dif-
ferences
Hereafter we survey the field of reinforcement learning from a com-
puter science perspective [39]. The biggest problem facing a reinforce-
ment learning agent is the temporal credit assignment. How do we know
whether the action just taken is a good one, when it might have far-
reaching effects? One strategy is to wait until the ”end” and reward the
actions taken if the result was good and punish them if the result was
bad. In ongoing tasks, it is difficult to know what the ”end” is, and this
might require a great deal of memory. Instead, insights from value it-
eration are used to adjust the estimated value of a state, based on the
immediate reward, r, and the estimated value, i, of the next state. This
class of algorithms is known as temporal difference methods (Sutton, 1988 :
[48]) and it is based on an adaptive heuristic critic algorithm (Barto, Sutton
& Anderson, 1983: [47]).
The adaptive heuristic critic (AHC) algorithm is an adaptive version
of policy iteration (Barto, Sutton & Anderson, 1983) in which the value-
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function is computed by an algorithm called TD(0). A block diagram
for this approach is given in Figure 5. It consists of two components: a
critic (labeled AHC), and a reinforcement-learning component (labeled
RL). The reinforcement-learning component can be an instance of any
of the k-armed bandit algorithms, modified to deal with multiple states
and non-stationary rewards. But instead of acting to maximize instan-
taneous reward, it will be acting to maximize the heuristic value, v, that
is computed by the critic. The critic uses the real, external reinforcement
signal to learn to map states to their expected discounted values given
that the policy being executed is the one currently instantiated in the RL
component. It remains to explain how the critic can learn the value of a
policy. We define 〈s, a, r, s′〉 to be an experience tuple summarizing a single
transition in the environment. Here s is the environment state before the
transition, a is its choice of action, r the instantaneous reward it receives,
and s′ its resulting state. The value of a policy is learned by using the
Sutton’s update formula (Sutton, 1988: [48]):
V (t+ 1, s) := V (t, s) + α (r(t) + γV (t, s′)−V (t, s)) (2.1)
Namely, whenever a state s is visited, its next estimated valueV (t+ 1, s)
is updated to be closer to r(t) + γV (t, s′), since r(t) is the instantaneous
reward received and V (t, s′) is the estimated value of the actually oc-
curring next state. The key idea is that r(t) + γV (t, s′) is an estimate
of the value of V (t+ 1, s′), and it is more likely to be correct because it
incorporates the real r(t).
Regarding the convergence of the class of AHC methods, an impor-
tant result by Williams and Baird [43] is that: under certain conditions,
if the learning rate α is adjusted properly (it must be slowly decreased)
and the policy (see equation 2.1) is held fixed, then the TD(0) algorithm
is guaranteed to converge to the optimal value function.
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Figure 5: Architecture for the adaptive heuristic critic.
2.2 Game theory: minority game
2.2.1 Reinforcement Learning in a Potential Game
The El Farol bar problem was introduced in 1994 by W. Brian Arthur [18]
as a framework to investigate how one models bounded rationality in
economics [44]. The original problem was defined as follows:
“N people decide independently each week whether to go to a bar that
offers entertainment on a certain night. For correctness, let us set N at
100. Space is limited, and the evening is enjoyable if things are not too
crowded - specifically, if fewer than 60 percent of the possible 100 are
present. There is no sure way to tell the numbers coming in advance;
therefore a person or an agent goes (deems it worth going) if he expects
fewer than 60 to show up or stays home if he expects more than 60 to
go. Unfortunately, it is necessary for everyone to decide at the same time
whether they will go to the bar or not. They cannot wait and see how
many others go on a particular Thursday before deciding to go them-
selves on that Thursday [27]”.
Posed in this way, the original problem implies that people are perfectly
rational and can therefore make use of deductive reasoning to decide in
their actions. But if there was an obvious method that all individuals
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could use to base their decisions on, then it would be possible to find
a deductive solution to the problem. However, no matter what method
each individual uses to decide if they will go to the bar or not, if everyone
uses the same method it is guaranteed to fail. Therefore, from the point
of view of the individual, the problem is ill-defined and no deductive
rational solution exists.
In the revisited El Farol bar problem, inductive reasoning was adopted
under the assumption that people are bounded rational. Namely, indi-
viduals decide whether they will go to the bar or not by employing men-
tal models to predict expected future attendance. In other words they
create forecasting models. If an individual using a specific forecasting
model predicts attendance to be low then, based on that model, that indi-
vidual would attend and vice-versa if attendance is predicted to be high.
In fact, no forecasting model can be employed by all individuals and be
accurate at the same time. Arthur (1994) investigated this model of the
El Farol bar problem through the use of computational experiments. The
results was that first, mean attendance always converges to the capacity
of the bar. Second, on average 40% of the active predictors forecasted
attendance to be higher than the capacity level and 60% below. Arthur
(1994) expands on these observations by noting that, the predictors self
organize into an equilibrium pattern or ecology.
In his work [53], Duncan Whitehead revisited the El Farol bar prob-
lem to investigate how one might best model bounded rationality in eco-
nomics. He began by modeling the El Farol bar problem as a market en-
try game and describing its Nash equilibria. Then, assuming that agents
are boundedly rational in accordance with a reinforcement learning mo-
del, he analyzed long-run behavior in the repeated game. The main re-
sult he obtained is that, in a single population of individuals playing the
El Farol game, learning theory predicts that the population is eventually
subdivided into two distinct groups: those who invariably go to the bar
and those who almost never do.
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2.2.2 The minority game
The minority game [23] is a variant of the El Farol Bar problem and it was
proposed by Yi-Cheng Zhang and Damien Challet from the University of
Fribourg. This problem embodies some basic market mechanisms, while
keeping mathematical complexity to a minimum. The Minority Game is
a repeated game where N agents have to decide between two actions,
such as buy or sell or attend or not. With N odd this procedure identi-
fies a minority action as that chosen by the minority. Agents who take
the minority action are rewarded with one payoff unit. Agents cannot
communicate with one another and they have access to publicly avail-
able information on the history of past outcomes for a fixed number of
periods. As in the El Farol bar problem, from a strategic point of view the
problem is ill-defined. Again it is postulated that in such complex strate-
gic interactions [40], agents may prefer to simplify their decision tasks by
seeking out behavior rules, or heuristics, that allocate an action for each
possible observed history of outcomes. While the El Farol Bar problem
was originally formulated to analyze a decision-making method other
than deductive rationality, the minority game focuses on the property
that no single deterministic strategy may be adopted by all participants
in equilibrium. Allowing for mixed strategies in the single-stage minor-
ity game produces a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, which is for
each player to choose each action with 50% probability, as well as multi-
ple equilibria that are not symmetric.
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Chapter 3
Smart Power Grid Scenario
In this chapter we begin by defining the main issue of our study. Then
we focus on the design of power markets.
3.1 Problem definition
A smart grid is an electricity network that can intelligently integrate the
actions of all prosumers connected to it, in order to efficiently deliver sus-
tainable, economic and secure electricity supplies. The main issue in this
thesis is to propose new solutions which help end-users to optimize their
consumption and better manage their own electricity costs. More specif-
ically, the challenge is to make elastic the demand for, and the supply
of, electricity of prosumers in order to optimize their energy cost based
on power market conditions and on suitable constraints on their power
consumption. For this purpose, the efficiency in this work is evaluated
according to the ability of users to plan their energy consumption and to
minimize their own electricity cost in the long run.
3.2 Architecture of smart power market
According to Robert Wilson’s statement [54], the liberalization of infras-
tructure industries presents classic economic issues about how organiza-
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tion and procedure affect market performance.
In particular, he focuses the analysis on the wholesale power mar-
kets. The liberalization of the power industry can be seen as the transi-
tion from the monopoly of infrastructures and services to an open and
competitive power market potentially of rather different kind. The aim
is to replace a tight regulation of vertically integrated monopolies (man-
agement of generation, transportation and supply of electricity) with a
light regulation of functionally specialized firms, with the supervision
of competitive markets. This implies important changes in the manage-
ment of the power infrastructure and the electricity market [9]. Hereafter
by power market ’architecture’ we mean a description of the main struc-
tural features of a market.
3.2.1 Physical constraints and market model organization
From the viewpoint of standard economic theory [29], wholesale mar-
kets for electricity are inherently incomplete and imperfectly compet-
itive [17, 21, 33]. The incompleteness is due to network externalities:
the power flow is governed by the Kirchhoff law. In fact the electricity
systems are subject to problems of physical coordination of energy flow
(inflows and outflows) during dispatching; transmission lines are con-
strained continuously by operational limits and environmental factors.
The competition in the power market is imperfect because the electric-
ity production is capital intensive and construction delays are long com-
pared to variations in supply and demand conditions [30]. On short time
scales, electricity prices are inherently volatile and the competition is of-
ten imperfect because of technical rigidities on the supply side and the
inelasticity of demand.
As consequence of network externalities, an important design issue
is the scope of the system operator’s authority dedicated to manage the
electricity markets. By definition, the system operator is entitled to coor-
dinate, control and monitor the operation of the electrical power system.
Given the differences in electricity market structures and regulatory poli-
cies around the world, there is no single standard market model. How-
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ever, any power market can be described in terms of two types of prop-
erties:
• The extent of reliance on market: every jurisdiction uses a differ-
ent structure of regulation, governance, system management, and
markets. Each market model must handle the basic elements such
as the management of the energy market, the transmission and the
reserve capacity. Coordination must occur between the electricity
market activities and the need to ensure the provision of electricity
to end-users [34].
• The allocation of risks: financial risk management is often a high
priority for participants in deregulated electricity markets due to
the substantial price and volume risks that the markets can exhibit.
A consequence of the complexity of a wholesale electricity mar-
ket can be an extremely high price volatility at times of peak de-
mand and supply shortages [22]. The particular characteristics of
this price risk are highly dependent on the physical fundamentals
of the market such as the mix of types of generation plant and rela-
tionship between demand and weather patterns [32, 36].
3.2.2 Integrated market model vs Unbundled market mo-
del
The integrated market model (see Figure 6 a) is a centralized market where
the spot market is coordinated through a system operator commitment.
The trading between producers and consumers takes place in a power
exchange. The system operator has the power to choose and decide for
suppliers the solutions to be used in order to maintain a stable distribu-
tion of electricity and their relative costs. By definition, a pool market is
a market which takes place in a power exchange. It can be subdivided
into three subsequent markets: the day-ahead market where the market
for energy takes place 24 hours in advance, the intra-day market where
the market for energy takes place 1 hours in advance and the real time
market where the market for energy takes place 5 minutes in advance.
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In the day-ahead and intra-day markets, bids from customers and offers
from suppliers are normally firm and they are matched in the market
clearing price1. The result of the market clearing price becomes an obli-
gation to take and deliver the matched volumes that will be financially
settled. Integrated designs start from the premise that, as in traditional
power pools, participants are bound together by a relational contract.
They employ the system operator as the exclusive manager of all mul-
tilateral markets: forward and spot, energy and transmission. The aim
is to realize gains from tight coordination in daily operations, and po-
tentially from longer-term obligations and subsidies aimed initially at
strengthening overall reliability. But problems may arise because mar-
ket manipulations by participants have limited counter-measures. As a
consequence, integrated designs are most effective when there is vigor-
ous competition, or, if competition is limited, when there is either strong
regulation or a legal cartel with ample powers of enforcement. Their
advantages are greater when optimization to meet system constraints is
more important than participants’ flexibility to optimize their own op-
erations and prices on system constraints are more accurate measures of
opportunity costs than clearing prices in markets.
In an unbundled market model (see Figure 6 b), the system operator
authority (monopoly) is limited to the sale of transmission rights, while
trading market strategy, and transmission and reserve capacity manage-
ment are assigned to each supplier involved in the wholesale market.
By definition, a Forward market is a sequential market of bilateral con-
tracts of selling energy, buying transmission rights to the transmission
system operator and buying energy reserve capacity for real time bal-
ancing during the dispatch of electricity. Bilateral contracts is a market
mechanism based on physical bilateral contracts. This means that sellers
and buyers freely enter into bilateral contracts for power supply. Sell-
ers will normally be generators and buyers will be distribution compa-
nies and eligible consumers. This kind of market starts from the oppo-
1Market clearing price: process aimed at finding the equilibrium price to be paid for
the volume of equilibrium determined by the intersection of the aggregate supply curve
and aggregate demand curve in a power exchange.
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site premise that participation is voluntary, with no long-term relational
obligations other than a general tariff approved by the regulator, and
that competing forward markets are encouraged to the extent feasible.
There is no explicit coordination of the markets for energy, transmission
and reserves. Because these markets typically operate in sequence and
clear independently, one needs faith in rational expectations to believe
they are reasonably efficient. The necessity of a system operator with
exclusive authority to manage the public good represented by the trans-
mission system is acknowledged. The system operator’s responsibilities
include real-time operations that protect system reliability, but its author-
ity to intervene in forward markets is limited to cases where prior com-
mitments promote reliability, such as day-ahead scheduling of transmis-
sion. The motives for limiting the scope of the operator’s authority are
to isolate its monopoly control of transmission from competitive energy
markets, and to enable unbundled pricing of energy and transmission.
Forward markets can impair efficiency when they are severely incom-
plete, poorly coordinated, or distorted by regulations. However, ample
flexibility and repeated trading opportunities might suffice to approxi-
mate markets and to improve coordination.
The two models (integrated market and unbundled market) are equiv-
alent (i.e. they could obtain the same result) without incompleteness of
the market model and imperfect competition between producers , con-
sumers and both. Similarly, we can say that the two models (pools and
bilateral contracts) are equivalent in a world without transaction costs.
In a world with transaction costs however, the bilateral contracts mo-
del may result in a sub-optimal outcome, where price and quantity do
not reflect real time demand and supply. Instead, in a pool, prices and
quantities should reflect actual demand and supply, more so depending
on how far ahead of real time the trade occurs. Though prices in a pool
may be more volatile than in a contracts market, there are hedging in-
struments available. In terms of institutional capacity, a simple contracts
market is more straightforward and less expensive to set up than a power
pool [19].
Hybrid designs enable coordinated markets where forward markets
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for energy and transmission rights can be unified to capture gains from
tighter coordination [24]. The key optimization is a smart market in
which prices and resource allocation are obtained from the real trading
market model implemented. With these ingredients available, privately
organized forward markets have many options for coordinating alloca-
tions of energy and transmission rights. A power exchange can conduct
a smart market for energy and transmission rights that also includes gen-
erators’ operating constraints, such as ramp rates and minimum produc-
tion rates, and auxiliary costs for startup and running, indeed all aspects
of unit commitment and scheduling that integrated systems keep within
the system operator’s control. The hybrid model, from the theoretical
point of view, will provide a trade off between two extremes. But it re-
quires on the one hand a priority in the application of one market model
at the expense of the other one (precedence for centralized market on for-
ward market or vice versa) and on the other hand the implementation of
reliable mechanisms which will prevent the given market organization
from market failures. For example, in the New England market pool the
centralized market uses a nodal pricing mechanism (price per location)
as an incentive for market participants. Nevertheless, the implementa-
tion of the smart market requires to cope with the pervasive externalities
of the network and with the need of flexibility of the system for risk man-
agement.
3.2.3 Power market microstructure
The use of market-based approaches in the electricity system operation
continues to mature. In general the electricity market is subdivided into
two categories: the wholesale market and the retail sale market. These
two markets interact with each other. The wholesale market involves
Generator Company (GenCo), Load Service Entities (LSE) or retailer as
brokers and distribution companies (DisCo) in a trading market [35]. In
the retail market [20], brokers forecast the aggregated resource needs of
consumer and shop in the wholesale markets available to them (see Fig-
ure 7). Moreover, the wholesale electricity market (also called Spot Elec-
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Figure 6: (a) Integrated market model, (b) Unbundled market model
tricity Market) can be subdivided into three subsequent markets:
1. the Day-Ahead Market (DA): which is a market finalized for the
exchange of wholesale power between producers, traders and eli-
gible customers. It takes place a day before the effective dispatch
of the electricity.
2. the Intra-Day Market (IDM): is an adjustment market on which
operators can modify the programs established in response to the
Day-Ahead Market submitting further bids on the sale or purchase.
It takes place an hour before the effective dispatch of electricity.
3. the Ancillary Services Market (ASM): is the market where the traders
make offers of availability of an increase or reduction of the power
injected or withdrawn in the grid. This information is used by the
transmission system operator to correct programs that violate the
limits of transit, and to balance the system in real time against de-
viations from the program.
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Figure 7: Wholesale and retail sale electricity market
These three markets operate in the pool market, which is under the
control of a single operator, who is normally known as Independent Mar-
ket Operator (IMO). The role of the Independent Market Operator in a
wholesale electricity market is to manage the security of the power sys-
tem in real time and co-ordinate the supply of and demand for electric-
ity, in a manner that avoids fluctuations in frequency or interruptions of
supply. The Independent Market Operator service is normally specified
in rules or codes established as part of the electricity market. The Inde-
pendent Market Operator function may be owned by the transmission
grid company, or may be fully independent. They are often wholly or
partly owned by state or national governments. In many cases they are
independent of electricity generation companies (upstream) and electric-
ity distribution companies (downstream). They are financed either by
the states or countries or by charging a toll proportional to the energy
they carry. The Independent Market Operator is required to maintain a
continuous (second-by-second) balance between electricity supply from
power stations and demand from consumers, and also ensure the provi-
sion of reserves that will allow for sudden contingencies. The Indepen-
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dent Market Operator achieves this by determining the optimal combina-
tion of generating stations and reserve providers for each market trading
period, instructing generators when and how much electricity to gener-
ate, and managing any contingent events that cause the balance between
supply and demand to be disrupted. System Operations staff undertake
this work using sophisticated energy modeling and communications sys-
tems. In addition to its roles of real-time dispatch of generation and man-
aging security, the Independent Market Operator also carries out investi-
gations and planning to ensure that supply can meet demand and system
security can be maintained during future trading periods. Examples of
planning work may include co-ordinating generator and transmission
outages, facilitating commissioning of new generating plant and procur-
ing ancillary services to support power system operation.
Furthermore wholesale transactions (bids and offers) in electricity are
typically cleared and settled by the independent market operator (see fig-
ure 8 ). In most of the electricity markets [19], the IMO uses a uniform
(or single) clearing price auction in which eligible participants place their
bids [10]. The IMO then dispatches the generators from lowest to highest
bids until all power demand is met. Each generator that is dispatched is
then paid the same price as what was paid to the last unit of electricity
needed to meet total demand. The uniform clearing price auction [25]
drives generators to reduce their operating costs so that their bids can be
lower and, hence, will be accepted. The generators that set the clearing
price, and therefore meet the last increment of demand, earn little or no
contribution to their fixed costs. The lower cost generators in turn are
able to recover some of their long-term debt and other expenses under
this auction design. Because the last increment of demand set the clear-
ing price, an explicit price signal to conserve electricity is established. For
certain customers who can reduce their demand, a price incentive can be
transparently seen.
Hereafter we give an example of how the market clearing price op-
erates in the pool market . The market clearing price is defined by the
system marginal price which is the result of the intersection between the
aggregated demand and supply curves. The system marginal price is the
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Figure 8: Pool electricity market.
quoted market price paid to all sellers by all buyers; it is the most expen-
sive offer price accepted by buyer to meet their demands. The market
clearing price can be subdivided into three steps:
1. Trading participants submit online hourly energy offers (price and
quantity): each generating company submits its offer curve; the of-
fer curve is a function assigning exactly one price to each quantity
o volume (megawatts) produced. More precisely this price is the
marginal cost (MC): the cost of producing one more unit of elec-
tricity given the total volume already produced (Q). Hence, each
point of this curve (price quantity pair) represents the minimum
sale price for the next unit to be produced. Similarly, every buyer
submits its bid curve. The bid curve is a decreasing function assign-
ing exactly one price to each quantity (megawatts). Each point of
the curve (price quantity pair) represents the maximum purchase
price for the next unit to be bought.
2. Matching of the aggregated offer and bid curves: the market oper-
ator sums analytically all offer curves (aggregation) and the result-
ing aggregated curve represents the total amount of energy that
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every seller will produce, given the marginal cost (or the selling
price) for the next unit of energy. Similarly, all bids curves are ag-
gregated. In this case the curve (see Figure 9) gives the information
about the marginal cost ( or the purchasing price for the next unit
of energy).
3. Price clearing: the intersection point of the two aggregated curves
determines the total quantity traded and the equilibrium price. The
equilibrium price is often called the winning price. All suppliers
who have submitted an offer less than, or equal to, the equilibrium
price are allowed to participate in the program production and in-
jection of energy into the grid. they are call in-merit suppliers. Vice-
versa, all buyers who have submitted a bid greater than, or equal
to, the equilibrium price are allowed to participate in the program
for withdrawal of energy from the grid and they are call in-merit
buyers (Figure 10).
Figure 9: Adding individual supply curves horizontally to find the market
supply curve (MC: Marginal Cost, Q:quantity).
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Figure 10: Equilibrium price determination
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Chapter 4
DEZENT: a distributed
power management and
distribution system
In this chapter, we move towards a completely distributed power grid
called DEZENT. In what follows, a detailed description of the DEZENT
power market is given.
4.1 The idea behind the DEZENT approach
The idea behind the decentralized power management system is to ex-
ploit the increasing integration of decentralized energy resources (DER)
into the distribution network. DER systems are modern technologies
based on solar or wind power, or on other renewables energy sources.
In particular we refer to the real-time and distributed power manage-
ment system DEZENT. DEZENT [49, 50, 51, 52] is the result of a R&D
project between the School of Computer Science and the College of Elec-
trical Engineering of Dortmund University, the E.ON Energy company
and the German research foundation (DFG). The project was devoted to
decentralized and adaptive electric power management through a dis-
tributed real-time multi-agent architecture. DEZENT philosophy is to
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make as local as possible the exchange of electricity between various pro-
sumers. Since the power market is managed in a decentralized manner,
prosumers able to carry out more exchanges at the local level will get
more benefits.
In the DEZENT R&D initiative, a multi-level bottom-up solution has
been developed where autonomous collaborative software agents nego-
tiate available energy quantities (the DEZENT algorithm [49, 50]). More-
over, since much of the production (e.g. from wind farms or from so-
lar panels) is highly unpredictable, the distributed negotiation algorithm
of DEZENT is finalized within intervals1 of 0.5 sec. Such a short in-
terval guarantees that the negotiation situation is considered stable, or
constant, for a fair and transparent bidding and offering of partners in-
volved. During each slot of 0.5 sec, the negotiation algorithm proceeds
bottom-up, from the 0.4 KV to the 110 KV layers, matching production
and consumption of electric power. In addition, a Demand Side and Sup-
ply Management (DSSM) algorithm [51] is applied in order to reduce the
need of balancing in the power market. At the end of the negotiation,
each prosumer independently and simultaneously adjust his/her bid-
ding strategies. This is carried out by the DECOLEARN algorithm [52]
which exploits reinforcement learning principles of machine learning.
4.2 Distributed Agent Negotiations in DEZENT
4.2.1 The power grid architecture
The DEZENT power management system focuses on a regional grid where
there is a substantial use of renewable energy sources. The power grid
architecture (see Figure 11 taken from [50]) is subdivided into four levels.
The first level (0.4 KV) is a low-range network covering neighborhoods.
The second level (10 KV) is a medium-range area network covering sub-
urbs (regional grid). The third level (110 KV) is a long-distance energy
transport network. Finally in the fourth level (380 KV) the electricity
1That interval will be called ”slot” in our terminology.
34
is produced from large power plants (coal, gas or nuclear). Most power
needs of prosumers are covered through alternative energy sources within
the first 2 layers and additional power needs are covered up to the fourth
level.
Figure 11: Power grid and associated agents.
At the negotiation layer, the balancing of demand and supply be-
tween participants is carried out through Balancing Group Managers
(BGMs) which are located in different network layers and operate in
parallel on each grid. A BGM is a financial instrument which balances
the supply and the demand of electricity between a producer and a con-
sumer who have submitted a similar bid. Moreover, the negotiation will
take place in each slot of a day. By definition, a slot is a time interval
of 0.5 sec. A day is discretized, resulting in a set of consecutive slots.
The distributed negotiations have to be finalized within single intervals.
Then the negotiation situation is considered stable, or constant, for a fair
and transparent bidding and offering.
During each slot of 0.5 sec, the negotiation algorithm proceeds bottom-
up, from the 0.4 KV to the 110 KV layers. The negotiation starts indepen-
dently for the groups on the lowest level. If a balance cannot be found
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for all customer agents in a group, then unsatisfied customers are sent to
the next-higher BGM and the negotiation scope is extended to that new
group of customers. Thus, a slot in DEZENT consist of 3 cycles of nego-
tiations and the sale (purchase) at a fixed cost of the electricity to (from)
the main reserve facility. Each cycle consists of 10 rounds of negotiations
in which unmatched bids and offers of customer agents are adjusted ac-
cording to their own negotiation strategies.
4.2.2 Preliminary definition
• Period: a period of negotiations has a duration of 0.5 sec. It con-
sists of 3 subsequent negotiations cycles followed by the contracting
phase at the main reserve layer.
• Cycle: a cycle is the negotiation handled by the relevant BGM. It
consists of 10 subsequent rounds in which the bid of the consumer
is forced to increase while the offer of the producer is forced to
decrease.
• Round: a round is the matching process between fixed bids and
fixed offers. During the process, given the current bid of a con-
sumer, similar producers are identified for the balancing of the en-
ergy needed.
• Price frame: [Ak, Bk] is the price frame of the negotiation for the
level k (1 ≤ k ≤ 3). Here Ak represents the lower bound of the
electricity cost and Bk the upper bound. The bid and the offer of
customers are forced to belong to that interval during a cycle of
negotiations at level k. The current frame of negotiations at level k,
is given by:
Ak := A0 + c(k) (4.1)
Bk := B0 − c(k) (4.2)
• Surcharge c(k) : the surcharge is an additional cost paid by each
customer at a given level of negotiation. It represents the amor-
tization and maintenance cost of power producers. This cost will
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increase gradually from the lowest level to the highest one.
c(k) :=
B0 −A0
2
· Sr · k (4.3)
where Sr is a constant, usually of the value of 20%.
• Bid (cent/Watthours): the bid represents the price per unit submitted
by a consumer during a round of negotiation n, n ∈ [0, 9]. It is
computed according to the bid function
bid (n) = − 1
eN
+Bk. (4.4)
where N = ns1 + s2. A tuple of the form (s1, bid (0)) represents the
negotiation strategy set by a consumer agent and the parameter s2
is determined by the opening bid: s2 = −ln (Bk − bid (0)).
• Offer (cent/Watthours): the offer represents the price per unit sub-
mitted by a producer during a round of negotiation n, n ∈ [0, 9]. It
is computed according to the function
offer (n) =
1
eM
+Ak. (4.5)
where M = nt1 + t2. A tuple of the form (t1, offer (0)) represents the
negotiation strategy set by a consumer agent and the parameter t2
is determined by the opening offer: t2 = −ln (offer (0)−Ak).
• Allowance (Watthours): the allowance is the maximum quantity of
energy a consumer is allowed to buy during a negotiation process.
• Similarity: a producer is said to be similar to a consumer if the dif-
ference between their offer and bid is less than or equal to a con-
stant epsilon (offer (n)− bid (n) ≤ ).
• Negotiated price (cent/Watthours): when a consumer Ck and a pro-
ducer Pk are similar, the negotiated prices per unit of energy is the
arithmetic mean of their bid.
price (k) =
bidCk (n) + offerPk (n)
2
(4.6)
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• Final unit price (cent/Watthours): an additional charge c(k) (see equa-
tion 4.3 above) is added to the consumer price and subtracted from
the producer fees, respectively. This surcharge guarantees that the
most favorable energy prices, for consumers as well as for produc-
ers, will be negotiated only on the lowest level.
priceCk/Pk :=
bidCk (n) + offerPk (n)
2
± c(k) (4.7)
• Price for the amount of energy contracted (cent): finally the price for
the energy contracted is given by :
consumerPrice = amount ∗ priceCk (4.8)
producerPrice = amount ∗ pricePk (4.9)
4.2.3 The DEZENT Algorithm
As mentioned in subsection 4.2, a period in DEZENT consists of 3 cycles
of negotiation and the sale or purchase of the electricity (at a fixed cost)
to the main reserve facility. Each cycle consists of 10 rounds of negotia-
tion in which bid and offer of customer agents are adjusted according to
their own negotiation strategies.
Beginning of each round. At the beginning of each round unsatisfied
consumers are identified and sorted according to their current bids by
the Balancing Group Manager of the level k. Then the consumers are
processed top-down starting with the highest bidding consumer. Of-
fers similar to the bid of the first consumer are identified and sorted by
price. Offers are processed top-down as well. For closing a contract be-
tween the first-listed consumer and the first-listed producer, the needs
of the consumer is fulfilled as far as possible within the allowance ca-
pacity. This mechanism prevents agent selfishness and avoids, for ex-
ample, a consumer to purchase a very high amount of energy leaving
the other consumers out in the cold. After purchasing a certain amount
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of watthours from one or more producers, the current consumer’s ne-
gotiation is interrupted and the algorithm proceeds with the next-listed
consumer. After processing the last listed consumer the algorithm starts
again with the first interrupted consumer (from the top of the list), al-
lowing it to continue its negotiation. Going through the customer cycle
again it proceeds so until no match can be found in the current round
any more. Then the algorithm stops and proceeds with the next round.
The bids and offers of unsatisfied customers are forwarded to it.
End of each round. At the end of a round we can distinguish the fol-
lowing cases:
1. The needed quantity is only a fraction of the offered quantity. The
offer of the producer is adjusted to the difference of the two quan-
tities. The present consumer is deleted. The algorithm proceeds
with the next consumer.
2. The two quantities match exactly. Producer and consumer are deleted,
and the algorithm proceeds with the next consumer.
3. The needed quantity is not completely covered by the offer. The
quantity of the bidder is adjusted to the difference, the producer
is deleted, and the algorithm proceeds to identify the next similar
producer.
4. If the need of the consumer is not yet satisfied but no similar of-
fers are identified or left, the algorithm proceeds with the next con-
sumer.
End of a cycle. At the end of a cycle (10 rounds of negotiations), un-
satisfied customers move up to the next BGM. After that, the negoti-
ation frame is shrunk by a fixed value Sr, typically 20% , thus lower-
ing/raising the upper/lower limits, respectively, by 10% (see Figure 12
). An example of the progression of a cycle of negotiation is illustrated
in figure 13: there are 6 participating consumers (ascending curves) and
5 producers (descending curves). In the figure, encircled bid/offer pairs
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(of similar values) refer to contracts and the numbers correspond to the
order in which contracts are closed. During the contracting phase, either
the consumer curve ends (contract 2) due to needed quantities smaller
than those offered, or the producer curve ends (contracts 3, 4) due to of-
fered quantity smaller than those needed. Finally, both curves end when
needed and offered quantities match exactly (contracts 1, 5, 6). In this ex-
ample two consumers remain unsatisfied by the end of the tenth round.
Figure 12: An example of negotiation frame and adjustment.
4.3 Distributed Agent learning in DEZENT
To optimize their behaviors, agents adapt their negotiation strategy at
the end of each period. The mechanism used in DEZENT for this pur-
pose is the reinforcement learning principle of machine learning (see
Chapter 2). We recall that the negotiation function of a user acting as
a consumer (see equation 4.4 ) is characterized by the tuple (s1, bid (0))
and that of a user acting as a producer (see equation 4.5) is character-
ized by the tuple (t1, offer (0)). Moreover, the parameter s1 is chosen
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Figure 13: Contracting for energy quantities.
from a finite set of real valued SC , the parameter t1 is chosen from a
finite set of real valued TP , the opening consumer bid is chosen from
the interval [A0, 1/2 (B0 +A0)] and finally, the opening producer offer
is chosen from the interval [1/2 (B0 +A0) , B0]. Let us denote the set of
feasible bids for a consumer C by OC and the set of feasible offers for
a producer P by OP . The strategy space of a prosumer is defined by:
A := (AC ,AP ) := (SC ×OC , TP ×OP ). Here the strategy spaces AC
and AP are used when the prosumer acts as a consumer and as a pro-
ducer respectively.
For the selection of the negotiation strategy of the next slot, 3 modes
have been defined in DEZENT: Exploitation, Explore1 and Explore2.
Exploitation selects the action with the maximum reward. Explore1 ran-
domly picks a strategy which is in the neighborhood of the action with
the maximum reward. Finally, Explore2 randomly picks any strategy. A
mode is randomly determined according to a fixed probability distribu-
tion. Then according to the determined mode, a strategy is selected and
executed.
At the end of a negotiation slot t, the final achieved price is normal-
ized according to the frame size of the negotiation of DEZENT. More pre-
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cisely, the unit cost of the electricity s(t) resulting from the negotiation is
normalized with respect to the frame size of the negotiation [A0, B0].
rC (t) =
B0 − s (t)
B0 −A0 for a consumer (4.10)
rP (t) =
s (t)−A0
B0 −A0 for a producer (4.11)
Notice that in both cases the parameter varies between 0 and 1, 1 being
the best value. Then, the temporal difference method of Sutton [48] is
used to derive the reward of the negotiation strategy currently executed.
More specifically, let a be a negotiation strategy and P (t, a) be the value
of the reward at the beginning of the slot t. Suppose that the strategy a
has been executed and let r(t) be the normalized price negotiated under
strategy a. The reward P (t+ 1, a) of the strategy a at the end of slot t is
computed by using the Sutton’s update formula :
P (t+ 1, a) := P (t, a) + α (r (t)− P (t, a)) ; 0 < α ≤ 1
Notice that the above formula is simplified with respect to formula (2.1).
In fact, the estimate r(t) + γV (t, s′) of the value of the next state s is
simplified here as r(t), i.e. γ = 0, the rational being that the only effect of
an action is in this case its reward and not any change of state.
4.4 Demand Side and Supply Management in
DEZENT
In DEZENT, the idea of the Demand Side and Supply Management (DSSM)
is to further reduce the need of energy balancing in the power grid. The
DSSM [51] attempts in a bottom-up fashion at providing the needed re-
serve energy during undersupply situations; and at channeling any re-
generative surplus of energy to those balancing groups where it could
be safely stored in real storage (like batteries) or in virtual storage fa-
cilities (water heaters, refrigerators). In practice, peak imbalances are
smoothened out at the earliest point of time, after each negotiation cy-
cle. At each negotiation level this process is handled in parallel by the
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involved BGMs. Finally, each BGM reconsiders the situation under the
assumption that consumers may give up some portion of their negoti-
ated power quantity, and producers may consider storing some of their
excess power.
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Figure 14: Negotiation period.
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Chapter 5
Prosumer Profiling
5.1 Introduction
The aim of our work is to make elastic the demand for, and the supply
of, electricity of prosumers in order to optimize their energy cost based on
power market conditions and on suitable constraints on their power con-
sumption. We believe that independent planning by the prosumers may
improve significantly the matching between production and consump-
tion in the DEZENT power grid. In fact, each prosumer should try as
much as possible to independently modify his/her power requirements
optimizing his cost. In practice, this could mean to help balancing the
power market, since the price will favor low consumption/high produc-
tion when the cost is high and vice versa. Moreover, our approach is
not centralized and, in this sense, is different from DSSM. The idea is to
exploit the (limited) ability of prosumers of planning in an autonomous
way their consumption/production. Hence they do not sign any contract
leaving the planning to others: our independent consumer planning is a
local matter involving only one prosumer.
More specifically, the prosumer is characterized by the class of con-
sumptions profiles (s)he can adopt during the day. By definition a profile
is a function defining consumption in terms of time. We consider a day-
long profile (24 hours) and the day is discretized resulting in a set of
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consecutive slots. The prosumer’s objective is to choose, out of the class
of consumptions profiles, the profile with the total minimal cost to use
for the following day. This choice is carried out by a controller taking
into consideration the unit cost of the energy after the DEZENT negotia-
tion. Namely given the class of consumptions profiles and the unit cost
of the energy of the previous day, the standard dynamic programming
algorithm is used to derive the optimal profile.
In section 5.2 we analyze the power consumption pattern of a power
consumer and in section 5.3 we discuss the assumptions on which the
controller design is based.
5.2 Power consumption pattern
From the viewpoint of the electricity consumption, captive consumers
(households, small businesses, ...etc) cannot actually consume more than
a certain amount of available power, even during seasonal drought. Tech-
nically, this is called contractually committed power. In the same vein, a
normal consumer cannot consume less than a certain threshold because
(s)he would like to stay home at a comfortable temperature and to re-
spect the technical constraints of indoor devices. The motivation is that
if (s)he consumes more than a certain threshold, then the local distributor
may cut off the supply of the electricity. If (s)he consumes less than a cer-
tain threshold, then (s)he is losing something in terms of welfare while
attempting to save money. However, one of the things (s)he can do is not
to give up energy consumption, but to postpone power needs which can
be possibly delayed [11, 37, 38, 41, 45]. In this case, the behavior of the
consumer is similar to that of a rechargeable battery: the total amount of
electricity consumed during an entire day will remain the same, while
the amount of electricity consumed during a section of a day might be
different.
The main issue is that electricity has a different price depending on
the time in which it is used. More specifically, it depends on several ex-
ogenous factors, e.g. the actual cost of energy at the global level, but also
the existence of convenient energy exchanges at the local level and the
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fairness of available market mechanisms. The relevant case we consider
is that of a decentralized power market like DEZENT where prices can
change rapidly and users may not have the explicit information about
the cost of the electricity. Hence the behavior (consumption) of the con-
sumer will be based on the information (s)he has on (i) the estimated cost
of the electricity and (ii) the consumption constraints. His goal is to min-
imize the electricity cost at the end of a day while consuming the same
amount of energy.
From the viewpoint of a smart house/building (see Figure 15), our
solution can be seen as a controller which plays the role of an advanced
metering infrastructure. At the physical layer, the controller represents
the interface between the power grid and the set of indoor devices of the
smart house. At the power market layer the controller will monitor the
cost of the energy and will take advantage of this information to plan the
energy consumption [31].
Figure 15: Model of a smart house energy production and consumption
optimization.
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5.3 Planning phase of the energy consumption
From the point of view of the prosumer, the unit cost of energy after the
DEZENT negotiation depends mainly on two factors: (a) the free mar-
ket power cost (energy reserve); (b) the prosumer environment: heavy
production, heavy consumption and equilibrated prosumer population
may yield rather different energy costs. The point (a) accounts for the
fact that the electricity may have a rather different price depending on
the time period, be it of the day, of the week or of the year. The variance
of the electricity cost in different periods of the day is particularly rele-
vant: high variance does offer the prosumer a better chance of allocating
his/her power needs when it is more convenient economically. On point
(b), we observe that prosumers who are not satisfied in their sub layers
are lifted up on the next layer and this might result in a less profitable
cost of the electricity. From now on, we will consider only the case of
users which are consumers.
The case of producers is for most aspect dual. The difference between
consumer and producer can be represented in our approach by different
constraints, in particular by the size of the energy storage media. The
producer with lots of intermittent sources will have a limited flexibil-
ity. However, energy sources like cogeneration systems (CHP) for the
production of heat and power and biogas could still provide consistent
energy reserves.
A consumer is characterized by the class of consumption profiles (s)he
can adopt during the day. Also, it is important when (s)he has to choose
a particular profile: (i) at the beginning of the day or (ii) slot by slot.
Furthermore, in the former case it must be decided what happens if the
actual consumption in a slot turns out to be different than the planned
consumption: the profile for the rest of the day should be replanned or
not? In our model, we characterize the allowed profiles as variations
with respect to the ordinary consumptions. They must satisfy the fol-
lowing constraints:
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1. the energy variation in a slot has a lower and an upper bound;
2. the energy consumed in the whole day is fixed, i.e. if in some slot
the consumption is lower than average, in some other slot it must
be higher. This constraint allows to delay (or to anticipate) a job
(e.g. a laundry washing cycle) but not to abolish it; thus the sum of
all variations must be 0.
3. summing up all the variations from the beginning of the day to
any time, we cannot exceed a lower and an upper bound. This
constraint accounts for available energy storage media, like elec-
tric vehicle batteries or thermic accumulations due to anticipated
heating, or delayed air conditioning.
Given the class of consumption profiles, the consumer will choose
the optimal profile on the basis of the information it has on the unit cost
of the energy. Of course he/she cannot foresee the future and will rely
on the information of past days. If the prosumer knew the actual cost
of energy in every slot, he/she could compute (by dynamic program-
ming) a profile of variations which, among the allowed profiles, would
optimize the gain. A reasonable estimate of the cost of energy in every
slot can be obtained by looking at the values in the previous day. In
fact, if we assume that the free market cost in the same slot of the pre-
vious day is the same, that the prosumer environment is the same and
that the DECOLEARN algorithm is close to convergence, we can safely
rely on the after-DECOLEARN costs of the previous day. Of course the
prosumer environment has a stochastic behavior, thus it might behave
differently in the two days. To improve the estimate, we could take an
average of several days, or we could install a new reinforcement learn-
ing process. However both approaches apparently do not offer signifi-
cant improvements experimentally, while in addition the latter choice is
computationally very expensive, since different slots should be equipped
with different parameters. In short, starting from a certain profile of the
power cost in the free market, which works as a scale factor, and from
a certain prosumer environment (heavy production, heavy consumption
or equilibrated population), the DEZENT simulator is used to extract the
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power cost at the prosumer level in every slot. Then dynamic program-
ming is used in a standard way to optimize cost reduction within the
allowed constraints. Finally the resulting profile is applied the following
day. Moreover as we assume that the optimization problem is largely
independent from the DEZENT negotiation, the planning phase and the
negotiation phase could operate with different timings, the former every
day and the latter every slot.
In summary, our approach depends on the following parameters: (a)
the profile of the free market power cost in every slot, and in particular its
variance; (b) the prosumer environment: heavy production, heavy con-
sumption or equilibrated prosumer population; (c) how to estimate the
cost of energy after the DEZENT negotiation; (d) the amount of allowed
power increase/decrease; and (e) the available reserve. Items (a) and (b)
affect the simulations but their values are not directly available to the
prosumer, while items (c), (d) and (e) are available inputs for prosumers
optimal planning.
Furthermore as at any moment the consumers can modify their plans
for whatever reason we study the problem of (sub) optimal repeated re-
planning for the rest of the day when consumption varies with respect
to the anticipated values. These changes can be due to the need of ad-
ditional power - which however does not require any changes of the
planned profile - or to the loss of a part of the available energy reserve.
5.4 Formal description of the problem and of
the proposed algorithm
Hereafter, the optimization problem and the proposed dynamic program-
ming algorithm used to solve it are defined.
50
Notations: some definitions and notations are listed below (N are the
natural numbers).
Discretized energy : s1, . . . , sn slots in a day, n : N
: e : R basic energy level, e > 0
: ae average consumption, a : N
: re maximal energy reserve, r : N
: r0e initial energy reserve, r0 : N
: ±ke maximal variation in energy consumption,
k : N, k ≤ a/2
: o : Z→ R overhead,
if 0 ≤ x then o(x) = x else x ≤ o(x) ≤ 0
Unitary energy cost : ci : R in slot si, i = 1, 2, . . . , n ci ≥ 0
Optimization problem: the optimization problem is then defined by the
decision variables, the function to be minimized and the constraints on
the energy consumption.
Decision variables : −k ≤ xi ≤ +k, xi : N
where xi is the variation for slot si, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
Cost function
to be minimized : f(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
(o(xi) + a)ci
Optimal cost : C = min
x1,...,xn
n∑
i=1
(o(xi) + a)ci
Constraints : ∀ 0 ≤ j ≤ n. 0 ≤ r0 +
j∑
i=1
xi ≤ r
:
n∑
i=1
xi = 0
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Algorithm: the proposed solution algorithm decomposes the problem
into subproblems, so that an efficient dynamic programming approach
can be employed. Let Cj(yj) : R ∪ {∞}, j = 0, . . . , n, 0 ≤ yj ≤ r be the
optimal energy costs for slots s1, . . . , sj , when the final energy reserve at
slot sj is yje. Here Cj(yj) = ∞ if energy reserve yje cannot be achieved
at slot j. Thus C0(y0) (no slot has elapsed yet) is everywhere ∞ except
for C0(r0) = 0.
Subproblems : Cj(yj) = min
x1,...,xj
j∑
i=1
(o(xi) + a)ci j = 1, 2, . . . , n
: ∀i′. 1 ≤ i′ ≤ j, 0 ≤ r0 +
i′∑
i=1
xi ≤ r
: r0 +
j∑
i=1
xi = yj 0 ≤ yj ≤ r
Dynamic
programming : Cj(yj) = min−k≤xj≤k
0≤yj−xj≤r
Cj−1(yj − xj) + (o(xj) + a)cj ,
j = 1, 2, . . . , n
: C0(y0) = if y0 = r0 then 0 else∞
: Cn(r0) = C
The value of Cj at slot j can be computed sequentially in terms of Cj−1
by looking backwards for Cj(yj) to the optimal energy costs at slot j − 1
for eligible values yj − xj of the energy reserve.
Finally, an optimal strategy S is any sequence S = (x̂1, ŷ1), . . . , (x̂n, r0)
such that the values of x̂j and of ŷj−1 are computed backwards from ŷj ,
j = n . . . , 1, by letting ŷn = r0, the final reserve being r0. Formally:
Optimal strategies : Cj(ŷj) = Cj−1(ŷj − x̂j) + (o(x̂j) + a)cj , j = 1, 2, . . . , n
: ŷn = r0
The time and space complexity of the algorithm are O(nrk) and O(nr)
respectively.
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Chapter 6
Experimental results
6.1 Controller Algorithm
The control algorithm has two inputs: (i) the definition of the class of
allowed consumer profiles; and (ii) the cost of a unit of energy which re-
sulted by the DEZENT negotiation in each slot of the previous day. The
output of the algorithm is an allowed profile assigning to each slot an
energy variation of minimal total cost. The complexity of such an algo-
rithm depends on the definition of the class of allowed profiles. For the
consumer characterization mentioned above in section 5.3, an efficient
dynamic programming algorithm can be defined: the subproblems are
the subprofiles (from the beginning of the day to a given slot) of mini-
mal cost for all the sums within the capacity of the energy reserve . The
complexity of the algorithm is quite good: it is linear in the number of
slots in a day, in the number of allowed sums and in the number of levels
(here five) of variation with respect to the ordinary energy consumption.
In what follows we present the operation of the controller algorithm.
A Java programming language has been used for the implementation
of the optimal controller and the available DEZENT simulator1 has been
extended to it.
1The DEZENT simulator has been kindly made available by the DEZENT consortium,
and deployed on the IMT cluster.
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6.2 Consumer characterization
The set of allowed consumption profiles could be defined in more flexible
ways, accounting for different classes of consumers and different param-
eters could be chosen for the consumer characterization. In our case, for
every slot the allowed power variation with respect to the ordinary con-
sumption has five levels: −2∆, −∆, 0, +∆ and +2∆. The value of the
deviation ∆ is 25% of the average energy consumption. If the consumer
has a bounded energy reserve, the available reserve capacity is between
−10∆ and 10∆. Moreover, each time the consumer uses the energy re-
serve, an additional cost is added [12]: 10 % more for the action −∆ and
15% more for −2∆. This constraint accounts for the fact that not all the
energy stored can be made available and a part of it is lost by the Joule
effect or by other kinds of energy transformation losses.
6.3 Space of the experiments
We performed extended experimental studies based on the available DEZENT
simulator and on the Java implementation of the optimal controller. An
experiment depends essentially on three parameters:
1. the free market power cost, which can exhibit high, low or average
variance: for this we chose real data from the day ahead market
prices of Germany [13, 14], Italy [15] and Switzerland [16] respec-
tively (see Figures 16, 17 and 18);
2. the prosumer environment, namely heavy production, heavy con-
sumption or equilibrated prosumer population, in which the to-
tal amount of the electricity produced in the subnet is respectively
greater than, less than and equal to, the total amount needed in
the subnet. In the heavy consumption situations, the additional,
needed power is made available at the large power plant level, at
a price which depends on the time of the day. Analogously for
the equilibrated population and heavy production situations. In
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all these cases, the profile cost of the electricity at the global level
(namely at the large power plant level) was the same for all days.
3. the available energy reserve capacity which is considered either fi-
nite or infinite.
For every combination of the parameters we synthesized the optimal
controller and computed the gain with respect to a neutral consumer op-
erating in the same environment, i.e. within a context of other prosumers
(not only consumers), which are the same in both cases. Furthermore we
expected that, the highest energy cost reduction is obtained when we
have a high variance on the profile cost of the electricity, the prosumer
environment is in the heavy consumption situation and the energy re-
serve capacity of the controller is infinite. Vice versa, the lowest energy
cost reduction corresponds to low variance, oversupply situation and fi-
nite reserve capacity.
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Figure 16: Day ahead power market: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - High
variance.
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Figure 17: Day ahead power market: Germany, 8 december 2012 - Average
variance.
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Figure 18: Day ahead power market: Italy, 18 june 2013 - Low variance.
6.4 Experimental studies
The experiments were conducted on the IMT cluster at the IMT Institute
of Advanced Studies Lucca, simulating a 3 day service period (see Table
1) and our comparative studies were based on the total cost of the elec-
tricity paid at the end of the last day. The performance of the controller
relies on how stable the negotiation process is in different days, which
in turn depends on the stochastic evolution of the other involved part-
ners. Here the last day has been considered, since in this way transitory
effects are minimized. In fact during the first day simulation correspond-
ing to 60 steps, the reinforcement learning component of the DEZENT
56
Table 1: Experimental Setup of the placebo test
Architecture
Negotiation Levels 1
BGM on Level 1 1
Clients 15
Producers (50− 200 KW) 10
Consumers (200 KW) 5
Electricity price Day duration: 60 slotsProfile cost of the electricity (free market)
Prosumer environment
Heavy consumption
Equilibrated prosumer population
Heavy production
Energy reserve InfiniteFinite: -10 to 10
Controller Class of consumption profilePlanning phase: optimization
Simulations
Duration: 3 days
Test 1: active consumer
Test 2: neutral consumer
simulator will gather as much information as possible and will become
stationary.
The first group of simulations concerns the high variance of the free
market power cost (day ahead power market: Switzerland, 9 march 2013)
along with the infinite reserve capacity of the optimizing controller. Fig-
ures 19 and 20 represent the result of the simulation in the heavy con-
sumption case of the prosumer population. Figure 19 synthesizes the
operation of the controller during the day 2 and 3 and Figure 20 com-
pares the electricity cost achieved at the end of the day 3. The two upper
curves of figure 19 represent the unitary cost of energy as resulting from
the negotiation phase at day 2 (curve in black color) and at day 3 (dashed
curve in blue color). The difference between the two upper curves gives
an idea of the possible variations between the outcomes of different ne-
gotiations. Notice that the profile of the global energy cost and the con-
text of competing prosumers is the same in both days. The two lowest
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curves of figure 19 represent the result of the optimization algorithm ap-
plied to the curve of day 2 (curve in red color) and to the curve of day 3
(curve in green color). The curves plot the sum (from the beginning of the
day) of the suggested variations with respect to the ordinary energy con-
sumption: according to the constraints we assumed on the consumption
profiles, the sum must stay between the available energy reserve capac-
ity and should end up at 0, i.e. the day long energy consumption should
be left invariant. We can notice that the controller correctly suggests vari-
ations which are opposite with respect to the negotiated cost. The three
curves in Figure 20 report the actual energy cost for day 3 of a neutral
consumer (upper, red curve), of a consumer employing the optimizing
controller (lower, blue curve) using the negotiated cost of day 2, and of
a consumer able to foresee the future (lower, green curve). In the latter
case the optimization algorithm is applied to the negotiated cost of the
same day 3. However, the two negotiated cost profiles are similar enough
to guarantee a remarkable economic advantage for the active consumer.
In fact the curves of the active consumer (lower, green and blue curve)
are close together while they are far away from that of the neutral con-
sumer (upper, red curve). Similarly Figures 21 and 22 show the results of
the negotiation in the equilibrated prosumer population case while Fig-
ures 23 and 24 concern the heavy production case. In general we see the
same informations as in the heavy consumption case mentioned above.
Furthermore if we compare the gain realized, in terms of cost reduction,
between the three prosumer population cases (heavy consumption, equi-
librated population and heavy production) then we can observe that the
gain realized decreases as we switch from the heavy consumption case
to the equilibrated population case, and from the equilibrated popula-
tion case to the heavy production case. This result accounts for the fact
that the power cost in the free market is higher than, or equal to, any
possible negotiated price in the subnet in DEZENT. Hence the positive
effect of the optimization procedure is more remarkable when the pro-
sumer context is heavy consumption. In fact in this case the effect of the
cost differences in the free market power are not obscured by the effect
of the negotiations.
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The second group of simulations is similar to the first one (day ahead
power market: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance) except for the
fact that the energy reserve capacity of the optimizing controller is finite.
The pairs of figures (25, 26), (27, 28) and (29, 30) are the result of the ne-
gotiation in the heavy consumption, equilibrated population and heavy
production case respectively. As we can see, the active consumer again
has spent less than the neural consumer in each case of the prosumer en-
vironment. Nevertheless if we compare the electricity cost achieved at
the end of the day 3 between the active consumer with an infinite energy
reserve capacity and that of the active consumer with a finite one, then
we can see that the active consumer with a finite energy reserve capacity
has spent more than the other. Namely the capacity of the energy reserve
influences the performance of the optimizing the controller: the higher
the capacity, the better is the allocation of the resource.
The third (see Figures from 31 to 36) and fourth (see figures from 37 to
42) groups of simulations concern the case of the average variance of the
electricity cost (day ahead power market: Germany, 8 december 2012).
Finally the fifth (see Figures from 43 to 48) and sixth (see Figures from
49 to 54) group of simulation corresponds to the case of low variance of
the electricity cost (day ahead power market: Italy, 18 june 2013). Three
observations can be made as result of the comparison between the active
and the neutral consumer:
1. The energy cost reduction increases as we switch from the low vari-
ance to the high variance of the free market power cost.
2. The energy cost reduction increases as we switch from the heavy
consumption situation to the heavy production situation of the pro-
sumers environment.
3. The energy cost reduction increases as the energy reserve capacity
of the optimizing controller switch from the finite case to the infi-
nite one.
In summary, the combination of those three results leads to the definition
of the best and worst case scenario. Namely the highest energy cost re-
duction was obtained when we have a high variance on the profile cost
59
of the electricity, the prosumer environment is in the undersupply situa-
tion and the reserve capacity of the controller is infinite (see Figure 20).
Vice versa, the lowest energy cost reduction corresponds to low variance,
oversupply situation and finite reserve capacity (see Figure 54).
Study of a mixed prosumer population.
In these simulations, the population of agents consists of 10 power pro-
ducers and 5 power consumers, where 2 consumers are always neutral,
2 are always active and the last one corresponds to the placebo agent
test which changes the role from being neutral in the first simulation and
active in the other. The free market power cost is that of Switzerland
which exhibits high variance. The available energy reserve capacity of
an active consumer is considered infinite. Figures 57 and 58 represent
the result of the simulation in the heavy consumption case of the mixed
prosumer population. Similarly Figures 59 and 60 show the results of the
negotiation in the equilibrated prosumer population case while Figures
61 and 62 concern the heavy production case. The significance of these
simulations will be discussed in the conclusion.
(Sub) optimal repeated re-planning: loss of the energy reserve.
In order to study the impact of the loss of the energy reserve on the per-
formance of the optimizing controller, we have considered the following
case: Germany (december 8, 2012), heavy consumption situation of the
prosumer environment and infinite energy reserve capacity of the con-
troller. We have simulated 2 types of energy loss in the same prosumer
environment: one happening at 9.75 o’clock (negotiation number 23) and
the other one at 12.5 o’clock (negotiation number 30). Hence the energy
reserve was not anymore available during the negotiation number 23, 30
respectively; and the controller has optimally replanned the energy con-
sumption for the rest of the day. Namely the sum of all the deviations
starting from the negotiation number 23, 30 respectively, to the end of
the day will be equals to 0. Then we have compared the result of their
energy costs achieved at the end of day 3 with respect to an active con-
sumer who is not subject to any energy loss.
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Figure 55 concerns the profiles of the energy used during the day 3.
The profiles are the result of the (sub)optimal re-planning that has hap-
pened at 9.75 o’clock (black curve) and 12.5 o’clock (blue curve) respec-
tively. We can see that the sum up of the deviation from the beginning
of the day does not end up to zero in both cases. The small black circle
indicates the level of the energy consumption just before the re-planning
phase took place at 9.75 o’clock. In fact at the end of the day, the value
of the energy reserve end up again to the same level (of value 38). Sim-
ilarly, the small blue circle indicates the level (of value 24) of the energy
consumption just before the re-planning phase took place at 12.5 o’clock.
In Figure 56, we have plotted the energy cost for day 3 of : (i) the
active consumer (upper, black curve) with energy loss happening at 9.75
o’clock, (ii) the active consumer (middle, blue curve) with energy loss
happening at 12.5 o’clock and (iii) an active consumer ( lower, red curve)
without energy loss. We can see that the highest energy cost has been
paid by the the consumer who has lost more energy (upper, black curve)
while the lowest one (lower, red curve) corresponds to the consumer who
was not subject to any loss of the energy reserve. In summary the con-
sumer who has lost more energy has spent more at the end of the day.
Hence during the re-planning, the additional cost paid is proportional to
the amount of energy lost.
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Controller operation: Switzerland 9 march 2013 − High variance − Undersupply − Infinite Reserve
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Figure 19: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - undersupply - infinite re-
serve: planning phase.
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Figure 20: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - undersupply - infinite re-
serve: active vs neutral.
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Controller operation: Switzerland 9 march 2013 − High variance − Balance − Infinite Reserve
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Figure 21: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - balance - infinite reserve :
planning phase.
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Figure 22: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - balance - infinite reserve:
active vs neutral.
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Controller operation: Switzerland 9 march 2013 − High variance − Oversupply − Infinite Reserve
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Figure 23: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - oversupply - infinite reserve:
planning phase.
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Figure 24: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - oversupply - infinite reserve:
active vs neutral.
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Controller operation: Switzerland 9 march 2013 − High variance − Undersupply − Finite Reserve(20)
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Figure 25: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - undersupply - finite reserve:
planning phase.
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Figure 26: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - undersupply - finite reserve:
active vs neutral.
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Controller operation: Switzerland 9 march 2013 − High variance − Balance − Finite Reserve(20)
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Figure 27: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - balance - finite reserve :
planning phase.
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Figure 28: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - balance - finite reserve: active
vs neutral.
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Controller operation: Switzerland 9 march 2013 − High variance − Oversupply − Finite Reserve(20)
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Figure 29: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - oversupply - finite reserve:
planning phase.
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Day 3: final achieved price − Switzerland 9 march 2013 − High variance − Oversupply − Finite Reserve(20)
 
 
 active
 active: anticipating the future
 neutral
Figure 30: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - oversupply - finite reserve:
active vs neutral.
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Controller operation: Germany 8 december 2012 − Average variance − Undersupply − Infinite Reserve
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Figure 31: Germany, 8 december 2012 - average variance - undersupply - infinite
reserve: planning phase.
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Figure 32: Germany, 8 december 2012 - average variance - undersupply - infinite
reserve: active vs neutral.
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Controller operation: Germany 8 december 2012 − Average variance − Balance − Infinite Reserve
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Figure 33: Germany, 8 december 2012 - average variance - balance - infinite reserve:
planning phase.
66
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
10
x 105
hours
to
ta
l c
os
t (c
en
t)
Day 3: final achieved price − Germany 8 december 2012 − Average variance − Balance − Infinite Reserve
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Figure 34: Germany, 8 december 2012 - average variance - balance - infinite reserve:
active vs neutral.
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Controller operation: Germany 8 december 2012 − Average variance − Oversupply − Infinite Reserve
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Figure 35: Germany, 8 december 2012 - average variance - oversupply - infinite
reserve: planning phase.
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Figure 36: Germany, 8 december 2012 - average variance - oversupply - infinite
reserve: active vs neutral.
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Controller operation: Germany 8 december 2012 − Average variance − Undersupply − Finite Reserve(20)
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Figure 37: Germany, 8 december 2012 - average variance - undersupply - finite
reserve: planning phase.
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Figure 38: Germany, 8 december 2012 - average variance - undersupply - finite re-
serve: active vs neutral.
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Figure 39: Germany, 8 december 2012 - average variance - balance - finite reserve:
planning phase.
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Figure 40: Germany, 8 december 2012 - average variance - balance - finite reserve:
active vs neutral.
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Figure 41: Germany, 8 december 2012 - average variance - oversupply - finite re-
serve: planning phase.
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Figure 42: Germany, 8 december 2012 - average variance - oversupply - finite re-
serve: active vs neutral.
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Controller operation: Italy 18 june 2013 − Low variance − Undersupply − Infinite reserve
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Figure 43: Italy, 18 june 2013 - low variance - undersupply - infinite reserve: plan-
ning phase.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
10
10.5
11
11.5
12
12.5
13
13.5
14
x 105
hours
to
ta
l c
os
t (c
en
t)
Day 3: final achieved price − Italy 18 june 2013 − Low variance − Undersupply − Infinite reserve
 
 
 active
 active: anticipating the future
 neutral
Figure 44: Italy, 18 june 2013 - low variance - undersupply - infinite reserve: active
vs neutral.
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Figure 45: Italy, 18 june 2013 - low variance - balance - infinite reserve: planning
phase.
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Figure 46: Italy, 18 june 2013 - low variance - balance - infinite reserve: active vs
neutral.
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Figure 47: Italy, 18 june 2013 - low variance - oversupply - infinite reserve: planning
phase.
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Figure 48: Italy, 18 june 2013 - low variance - oversupply - infinite reserve: active vs
neutral.
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Figure 49: Italy, 18 june 2013 - low variance - undersupply - finite reserve: planning
phase.
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Figure 50: Italy, 18 june 2013 - low variance - undersupply - finite reserve: active vs
neutral.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
−20
−10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
hours
u
n
it 
co
st
 e
ne
rg
y 
(ce
nt)
Controller operation: Italy 18 june 2013 − Low variance − Balance − Finite Reserve(20)
 
 
unit cost day 2
optimal profile day 2
unit cost day 3
optimal profile day 3
Figure 51: Italy, 18 june 2013 - low variance - balance - finite reserve: planning phase.
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Figure 52: Italy, 18 june 2013 - low variance - balance - finite reserve: active vs
neutral.
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Figure 53: Italy, 18 june 2013 - low variance - oversupply - finite reserve: planning
phase.
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Figure 54: Italy, 18 june 2013 - low variance - oversupply - finite reserve: active vs
neutral.
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Figure 55: Controller operation: - Germany 8 december 2012 - Average variance -
Undersupply - Infinite reserve - (sub)optimal profile.
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Figure 56: Day 3: final achieved price - Germany 8 december 2012 - Average vari-
ance - Undersupply - Infinite reserve - Impact of (sub)optimal replanning.
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Figure 57: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - undersupply - infinite reserve
- mixed consumer population: planning phase.
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Figure 58: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - undersupply - infinite reserve
- mixed consumer population: active vs neutral.
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Figure 59: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - balance - infinite reserve -
mixed consumer population : planning phase.
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Figure 60: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - balance - infinite reserve -
mixed consumer population: active vs neutral.
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Figure 61: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - oversupply - infinite reserve
- mixed consumer population: planning phase.
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Figure 62: Switzerland, 9 march 2013 - high variance - oversupply - infinite reserve
- mixed consumer population: active vs neutral.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future
Work
In this thesis we have proposed a controller based on which end-users
may optimize their energy consumption and better manage their own
electricity costs. The idea behind our approach is to make elastic the
demand for, and the supply of, electricity of prosumers in order to opti-
mize their energy cost based on power market conditions and on suitable
constraints on their power consumption. We focus, in particular, on the
planning phase of the consumption [42] of prosumers based on the ne-
gotiation mechanism of DEZENT. The general idea behind the planning
(optimization) phase of a consumer is to plan consumption as smartly
(delay or anticipate the consumption) as possible during a day, a week, a
month or even a year. The results of this behavior is the minimization of
the electricity cost in the long run, under certain assumptions on energy
costs, as resulted by local negotiations, and on the acceptable variations
of consumer requests.
The approach we proposed depends on the following parameters: (a)
the profile of the free market power cost in every slot, and in particular its
variance; (b) the prosumer environment: heavy production, heavy con-
sumption or equilibrated prosumer population; (c) how to estimate the
cost of energy after the DEZENT negotiation; (d) the amount of allowed
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power increase/decrease; and (e) the available reserve. Items (a) and (b)
affect the simulations but their values are not directly available to the
prosumer, while items (c), (d) and (e) are available inputs for prosumers
optimal planning.
We have performed extended experimental studies based on the avail-
able DEZENT simulator and on a Java implementation of the optimal
controller. An experiment depends essentially on three parameters: (1)
the free market power cost, which can exhibit high, low or average vari-
ance: for this we chose real data from the day ahead market prices of
Switzerland, Italy and Germany respectively; (2) the prosumer environ-
ment, namely heavy production, heavy consumption or equilibrated pro-
sumer population; and (3) the available reserve capacity which can be
either finite or infinite. For every combination of the parameters we syn-
thesized the optimal controller and computed the gain with respect to
a neutral consumer operating in the same environment (i.e. within a
context of other prosumers, which are the same in both cases). As ex-
pected, the highest energy cost reduction was obtained when we had a
high variance on the profile cost of the electricity, the prosumer environ-
ment was in the undersupply situation and the reserve capacity of the
controller was infinite. Vice versa, the lowest energy cost reduction has
corresponded to low variance, oversupply situation and finite reserve
capacity.
Furthermore, the study of the problem of (sub) optimal repeated re-
planning for the rest of the day has shown that a prosumer having to
consume more than expected will pay a remarkable additional cost at the
end of the day which depends also on the increased unit costs; in the case
in which a part of the available energy reserve is lost, the additional cost
paid is proportional to the amount of energy lost. However, replanning
is definitely convenient with respect to continuing with the old plan, just
adapted for the loss of power.
A main contribution of the thesis is the combination of the reinforce-
ment learning mechanism at the DEZENT level and of the control mech-
anism used for profile optimization. These two mechanisms are not in-
dependent: rather, a negative feedback loop is present, between them.
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During the reinforcement learning step the agent updates the weights
of its negotiation strategies according to the amount of energy it needs.
Next, the control mechanism takes into account the energy cost which is
the effect of the negotiation to determine how much energy it requires.
The simulations already show the effects of this feedback loop.
One of the open issues is the global feedback effect of our introduced
controller in a consumer population where each consumer can make use
of it. In fact each controller in use might, independently and locally, in-
crease its consumption during periods in which the electricity price turns
out to be low. Hence at the prosumer population level, the electricity
demand will increase, possibly quite a lot, during those periods. This
feedback effect will lead to the increase of the energy cost during peri-
ods in which the price is in reality convenient. Eventually the system
may oscillate. This may lead to congestion issues on the behavior of the
controller.
For the study of the congestion issue, additional simulations have
been made where more than one active consumer is present in the envi-
ronment. The possible congestion problem was then made explicit by the
negative feedback effect already mentioned above, now increased due to
the multiplicity of active prosumers. Again the main result we obtain
is that the agent has spent less when making used of the control mech-
anism (see Figures 58, 60 and 62). The comparison between an active
and a neutral prosumer was still meaningful, since it shows, in the Nash
style, the convenience for a single prosumer to adopt the active strategy.
Of course more extensive simulations would be needed to study the con-
gestion problem (evidenced e.g. by a difficult convergence of the learn-
ing process), but on the one side we did not find any hint of congestion
in our limited experiment, on the other hand the literature on reinforce-
ment learning in the presence of congestion (e.g. the El Farol problem
[18, 39], described in Section 2.1) could suggest convenient countermea-
sures easily applicable in the DEZENT approach.
Future work might consider particular kinds of prosumers and their
energy storing devices, e.g. batteries of electric cars, modeling their pe-
culiar abilities of adapting their needs to variable energy cost profiles.
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